South-South Development Cooperation: Humanitarian and Global or Merely National?*

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I. Introduction

Development cooperation is one of the last frontiers left for the global community to embrace. The world has become smaller and closer since the end of the Cold War and the advent of globalization that began in the late 1980s. We have witnessed an explosive growth of multinational corporations (MNCs), which have become larger than many developing countries; internet that brought the world’s people together across time zones, languages, and cultural differences; and international organizations, national governments as well as civil society organizations attempting to solve global problems such
as poverty, financial crisis, terrorism and global warming.

People’s basic desire for economic well-being has helped spread the principles and practices of capitalism throughout the world, and the end of the Cold War appeared to have demonstrated that capitalism was the answer that many nations in the world have sought for the well-being of their nation and people. However, the end of the Cold War has not ended extreme poverty in many parts of the world. Thus, in 2000, 189 nations’ leaders came together at the United Nations (UN) to adopt the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) to halve the world’s extreme poverty by 2015 (UN 2000). The UN and OECD in particular have led this crusade to reduce poverty in the world.

In spite of some real progress made toward attaining the UN MDGs, many of the goals are in jeopardy of falling short of their targets. The global financial crisis, which began in the US in 2008, quickly spread across the globe, and its devastating effects on developing countries are triple-fold: (1) access to foreign credit is severely impaired; (2) access to foreign markets to export their products is severely restricted; and (3) development cooperation funds and support from developed nations are in jeopardy of reduction due to the impact of the crisis on their domestic economies.

This paper focuses on development cooperation and official development assistance (ODA). Official development assistance has been an important tool in which the developed nations in the world have assisted developing nations. During economic hardships, it is critical that (1) assurances be made to recipients of ODA that the current level of assistance will remain in spite of the crisis; (2) dialogue to increase development assistance due to short-term needs in recipients due to the triple-fold impact of the financial crisis; and (3) seek new donors and practices of development cooperation
to fill the potential gap left behind by traditional donors.

Along with the UN, OECD has played an important role in shaping the guidelines and practices of ODA. In particular, OECD’s Development Assistance Committee (DAC) members, which represent the most advanced industrialized economies in the world, have provided the lion’s share of ODA. However, we have also witnessed a growing trend among non-DAC member countries providing ODA to developing nations. Net ODA disbursements from 15 non-DAC members have increased from $1 billion to $4.2 billion from 1995 to 2005, and these countries provide 5% of the world’s ODA (O’Keefe 2008). It is also estimated that they will double their aid by 2010 (Woods 2008).

This paper is an effort to understand whether development cooperation from the non-DAC countries represent a new South-South cooperation, which is qualitatively different from traditional donors and their North-South cooperation. The paper’s goal is three-fold: (1) to provide a brief overview of the global discourse on, and key global institutions of, development cooperation; (2) ODA activities of emerging vs. traditional donors; and (3) ascertain whether this new South-South development cooperation presents a paradigm shift or a more limited change in development cooperation. In order to examine the above issues, the paper utilizes OECD/DAC Peer Review of traditional donors and national data sources as well as OECD/DAC empirical data rather than proclamations made in various policy statements and papers by respective governments. The latter will not be used as empirical evidence since they do not necessarily reflect the actual development assistance and aid activities.
II. Global Discourse on Development Cooperation

The global compact on development and poverty reduction is summarized in the UN Millennium Development Goals (2000). The UN and other international organizations and governments noted with great alarm that development assistance had sharply decreased with the end of the Cold War when the Super Powers shifted their attention from developing countries to other nations in need or in search of new opportunities. Extreme poverty persisted in Sub-Saharan Africa and other regions of the world, and there were renewed attention and discussions about development cooperation for poverty eradication but also for the stability of world peace. As a result, the UN MDGs were devised to call for global cooperation to reduce poverty in the world.

The OECD has also played an important role in providing guidelines and evaluation schemes so that both donors and recipients of ODA could work together to raise the volume and quality of ODA. ‘Shaping the 21st Century’ announced by OECD/DAC in 1996 served as a precursor to the UN MDGs as well as the High Level Forum on Aid Effectiveness (OECD 1996; OECD 2005).

1. UN and the Millennium Development Goals (2000)

In September 2000, at the 55th UN General Assembly 189 world leaders adopted one of the most comprehensive and global declarations in history - the ‘Millennium Declaration’ (UN 2000). This declaration stipulated that the world should endeavor to work together on an array of commitments including world peace, security, development, and human rights. Among
these agendas the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) were focused on development and poverty eradication, and were comprised of eight development goals, 18 sub-goals and 48 indicators. The eight goals are as follows (UN 2000):

- Goal 1: Halve extreme poverty and hunger
- Goal 2: Achieve universal primary education
- Goal 3: Empower women and promote equality between women and men
- Goal 4: Reduce under-five mortality by two-thirds
- Goal 5: Reduce maternal mortality by three-quarters
- Goal 6: Reverse the spread of diseases, especially HIV/AIDS and Malaria
- Goal 7: Ensure environmental sustainability
- Goal 8: Create a global partnership for development, with targets for aid, trade and debt relief.

The MDGs have the following important characteristics: (1) understanding of poverty as a multifaceted phenomenon requiring a multifaceted solution; (2) time-specific and measurable targets; and (3) partnership of the developed and developing countries for attaining the goals. Under the leadership of the United Nations, it was the first time in history that almost all the leaders in the world, including advanced industrialized nations, developing nations as well as least developed nations recognized collectively that poverty in the world was a common global problem. Without this recognition, a global course of action could not be agreed upon. Instead of pointing fingers at the poverty-stricken countries for their lack of diligence and motivation, there was a critical recognition that poverty in some cases was not internally (domestically) created, but a problem left behind by colonialism, war, and fight for hegemony between Super Powers. It is commendable that the
nations suffering from extreme poverty agreed to the MDGs without asking questions about who are the “real culprits” of their misfortune. If they had dwelled on that matter, the UN MDGs may not have been endorsed by advanced industrialized nations in fear of retribution. Poverty in the world was no longer just a problem for the poor, but a global problem that called for global cooperation.

Another significant change in the thinking about poverty is that it is a multifaceted phenomenon. In the past, international financial institutions including the World Bank defined poverty as lack of income and economic development. Thus, their prescriptions focused on providing means to increase income and attain economic development. However, as pointed out by leading scholars of poverty, poverty is not merely an economic condition, but a result of multifaceted failures including war, natural disasters, and epidemics along with slow or low economic development (Sen 1999; Sachs 2005; Narayan et al. 1999; Stewart, Saith and Harriss-White 2007). The eight goals of the MDGs reflect this new understanding of poverty, and deal with gender equality, health and illness, environment, war and security as important facets of reducing poverty along with economic issues.

Although there has been some progress in attaining the UN MDGs, the attainment of the 2015 target seems to be a pipedream for some of the goals. In the Millennium Development Goals Report 2008, Ban Ki-Moon, the Secretary-General of the UN recognized three critical challenges facing the world that may derail the efforts of MDGs including (1) global financial crisis; (2) global food crisis due to rising food prices; and (3) global warming (UN 2008). The UN sees these as significant crises that may derail the efforts thus far made on the MDGs, and may in fact act as a major obstacle toward attaining the 2015 targets.
<Table 1> Millennium Development Goals Progress Chart (2008)

<table>
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<th>Goals</th>
<th>Accomplishments</th>
<th>Areas of Low Level of Accomplishment</th>
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| 1. Eradicate Extreme Poverty and Child Famine:  
- Address the world population living with less than 1.85/day (1990-2015)  
- Halve the world children dying of famine | - Share of population living under extreme poverty in the world has gone down. | - Pockets of extreme poverty remain  
(Sub-Saharan Africa, former Soviet-bloc nations in the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), and South-Eastern European nations).  
- Reduction of Hunger: Sub-Saharan Africa and South Asia continue to face problems.  
1/4 of all children in developing countries are underweight may have long-term consequences of undernourishment.  
- Increased refugees in Southern and Western Asia and sub-Saharan Africa |
| 2. Universal Primary Education:  
- Free primary education for all boys and girls | - Overall good progress. In most of the regions (8 out of 10 regions) 90% has been achieved. | - Sub-Saharan Africa with 71% was the lowest region in the world.  
- Many are unlikely to attain the goal by 2015. |
| 3. Gender Equality:  
- Eliminate gender disparity in primary education by 2005 and all levels by 2015 | - Gender parity index is 0.95% in 6 out of 10 regions. | - Areas within Sub-Saharan Africa, Eastern Asia, Latin America, the Caribbean continue to have relatively high levels of child mortality.  
- Sub-Saharan Africa, Oceania and West Asia were particularly weak.  
2/3 of employed women in developing countries are in vulnerable jobs.  
1/3 of developing countries have less than 10% women in the parliament. |
| 4. Reduce Child Mortality:  
- Reduce under five mortality rate by 2/3 (1990-2015) | - Child mortality from measles has fallen substantiably. | - Many nations continue to face poor maternal health conditions. Progress is worst in Sub-Saharan Africa and South Asia.  
- More than 1/2 million women die of complications from pregnancy or childbirth. |
| 5. Improve Maternal Health:  
- Reduce maternal mortality ratio by 3/4 (1990-2015) | - Some progress has been made. | - Sub-Saharan Africa, Eastern Asia, Latin America, the Caribbean continue to have relatively high levels of child mortality.  
- More than 1/2 million women die of complications from pregnancy or childbirth. |
| 6. Combat HIV/AIDS, Malaria, and Other Diseases:  
- Halt and reverse the spread of HIV/AIDS and other diseases by 2015 | - Access to safe drinking water expanded (1.6 billion people since 1990)  
Use of ozone-depleting substances has been nearly eliminated  
TB incidence is declining | - Sub-Saharan Africa, Eastern Asia, Latin America, the Caribbean continue to have relatively high levels of child mortality.  
- Sub-Saharan Africa, Oceania and West Asia were particularly weak.  
2/3 of employed women in developing countries are in vulnerable jobs.  
1/3 of developing countries have less than 10% women in the parliament. |
| 7. Ensure Environmental Sustainability:  
- Halve the population without access to safe drinking water and basic sanitation by 2015  
- Improve lives of 100 million slum dwellers by 2020 | - Access to safe drinking water expanded (1.6 billion people since 1990)  
Use of ozone-depleting substances has been nearly eliminated  
TB incidence is declining | - Deforestation, declining biodiversity, growing greenhouse gas, and expansion of slum are of major concern.  
- Almost 1/2 of the developing world population (2.5 billion) lives without improved sanitation.  
- More than 1/3 of the urban population in developing countries lives in slum conditions.  
- Improving basic sanitation needs extraordinary effort |
| 8. Global Partnership for Development:  
- Address special needs for LDC, landlocked countries, etc.  
- Developing Country’s debt relief | - Debt-servicing fall in developing countries  
Private sector has increased access to essential drugs  
Mobile phone technology is spreading throughout the developing world. | - Developing countries’ foreign expenditure continues to decline  
- Risks of falling short of the 2005 commitments  
- International trade negotiations are behind schedule and may fall short of development-oriented outcome.  
- Barriers to exports from developing countries to developed countries are remaining  
- Internet users are very low in Sub-Saharan Africa |

http://millenniumindicators.un.org/unsd/mi/mi_goals.asp
Table 1 presents the most recent status of the attainment of the UN MDGs (UN 2008). It shows that there has been some progress made toward reducing extreme poverty in the world, but sub-Saharan Africa remains vulnerable to extreme poverty resulting in further problems of hunger, malnutrition in children, and refugees. Universal primary education appears to have seen most progress, yet sub-Saharan Africa lags behind other regions in the world. Gender equality and child mortality were improved, but with pockets of higher child mortality in sub-Saharan Africa, Latin America and the Caribbean. Although diseases such as HIV/AIDS, Malaria, and tuberculosis have fallen in most parts of the world, HIV/AIDS continues to be a problem in sub-Saharan Africa. Environmental sustainability is at risk in the areas of carbon dioxide emissions, greenhouse gas, and basic sanitation. Global partnership for debt-relief, increasing expenditure in developed nations, and trade barriers all face great problems, which are exacerbated by the world’s financial crisis.

2. OECD/DAC and High Level Forums on Aid Effectiveness

The Organization for Economic Co-Operation and Development (OECD), and its Development Assistance Committee (DAC) are very important in understanding the role of donors of ODA. OECD/DAC’s members include the wealthiest nations in the world which are providing the lion’s share of ODA. DAC produces many guidelines and convenes official meetings to discuss and disseminate best practices for development cooperation. Since the membership of DAC represents most all of the traditional donors, we will review the OECD/DAC recommendations to provide us with an
understanding about the best practices of ODA from the traditional donors’ perspective.

The High Level Forum (HLF) on Aid Effectiveness organized by OECD/DAC has been an important global forum to discuss various issues related to ODA among donors, recipients (partners) and international organizations. Their recommendations provide us with an idea about the global discourse on the quality of aid.

OECD was founded on the basis of the Organization for European Economic Council (OEEC), which had been founded in 1948 to implement the Marshall Plan in Europe. Its membership expanded when OECD was created in 1961 with 20 member nations including the US, the UK, Canada, and many European nations. Its membership expanded beyond Europe with the ascension of Japan (1964), Finland (1969), New Zealand (1973) and Australia (1974). OECD expanded its membership to newly industrializing countries and transition economies since the 1990s including Mexico (1994), Czech (1995), Hungary (1996), Poland (1996), Republic of Korea (1996) and Slovakia (2000). OECD headquarter is in Paris, France where it was first founded.

OECD aims to “bring[s] together the governments of countries committed to democracy and the market economy from around the world to: Support sustainable economic growth, Boost employment, Raise living standards, Maintain financial stability, Assist other countries’ economic development, [and] Contribute to growth in world trade” (OECD homepage 2009). It is an organization “where governments compare policy experiences, seek answers to common problems, identify good practice and coordinate domestic and international policies (OECD homepage 2009). As such, OECD plays an important role in the world as leaders in terms of levels of economic
OECD played a very important role preceding the UN MDGs. The Development Assistance Committee (DAC) is the primary organization focused on aid to developing countries with the goals of expanding the volume of aid and enhancing the effectiveness of aid. It was formed based on the Development Assistance Group (DAG) under the OEEC, and has been reconstituted as the DAC in 1960 in preparation for the OECD’s founding in 1961. The DAC is one of 26 standing committees of OECD, and is considered to be one of the most important committees of the OECD along with the Economic Policy Committee and the Trade Committee. It has 23 members including the most advanced industrialized countries and the European Commission, and is responsible for the lion’s share of development assistance.

In 1995, the OECD/DAC announced the importance of “Development Partnership in the New Global Context” in which it promoted the need to work together with the recipient (partner) countries of development assistance for capacity building. In 1996, the OECD/DAC published the “Shaping the 21st Century: The Contribution of Development Cooperation,” in which it announced the International Development Goals (IDGs). The IDGs and Development Partnership in the New Global Context (1995) have heavily influenced the vision and action plans in the UN MDGs.

The OECD/DAC held the High Level Forums (HLF) on Aid Effectiveness since 2003 to help attain UN MDGs. The first High Level Forum (HLF 1) was held in Rome, Italy in 2003 to discuss the significance of aid harmonization. The second High Level Forum (HLF 2) led to the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness (2005), which focused on the quality of aid – i.e., effectiveness and efficiency – vis-à-vis volume of aid. And at
the HLF 3, the Accra Agenda for Action (2008) renewed the commitment toward a true partnership required for effective ODA.

1) Rome Declaration on Harmonization (2003)

The major donors of ODA including multilateral development banks, and donor and recipient country representatives in 2003 gathered in Rome for the first High Level Forum on Harmonization. Responding to a growing concern that a variety of donor procedures and requirements for aid preparation, implementation, and monitor lead to inefficient aid, the Rome meeting focused on aid harmonization. In particular, the participants discussed methods for efficient use of financial resources; capacity building in partner countries; and harmonization among donor countries and organizations in aid policies, procedures and practices in order to improve effectiveness of aid.

Following up on the Monterrey Consensus on Financing for Development (2002), the donors committed to take action to improve the effectiveness of aid and to make concrete progress by the next High Level Forum to be held in early 2005. The commitments of the donors in the Rome Declaration on Harmonization are as follows (OECD 2003):

- Donors should deliver their aid in accordance with the partner countries’ development priority and strategy
- Donors will review and identify ways to improve donors’ policies, procedures and practices in order to enhance harmonization of donors
- Donors should provide support for country analytic work in order to ensure partner countries to take greater leadership and ownership of development results
2) Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness (2005)

As a follow-up to the Monterrey Conference on Financing for Development (2002) and the Rome Declaration on Harmonization (2003), the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness was announced at the second High Level Forum on aid effectiveness (HLF 2) to manage the increasing volume of aid (2005). The Paris Declaration is based on five key principles that lay down a practical, action-oriented road map to improve the quality of life of the poorest people in the world. The Declaration was endorsed by 107 countries including South Korea, 26 multilateral and bilateral development institutions, and 14 civil society organizations (OECD 2005).

The key principles were based on an understanding that low effectiveness of aid was due to both donor and recipient countries. Thus, the Declaration asked for the commitments of all stakeholders including donors, recipients, as well as development organizations, to join together in increasing aid effectiveness. The Paris Declaration was different from previous agreements since it offered a practical mechanism for implementation in order to make aid truly effective with 57 concrete action plans and 12 aid evaluation indicators. The five key principles are as follows (OECD 2005):

(1) Ownership
The recipient countries should commit to take initiative and ownership in developing and implementing their national development strategies. The recipient governments need to strengthen their capacity to effectively manage aid.

(2) Alignment
Donors should align their aid program with the recipient countries’
national development strategies, institutions and procedures.

(3) Harmonization
Transaction costs should be reduced through donor-partner consultations. Implementation of joint assessment and joint evaluation will be encouraged in order to strengthen donor-partner coordination.

(4) Managing for Results
Establish and implement a result-based aid system. Recipient countries should endeavor to establish transparent results-oriented reporting systems, assessment framework and monitor systems.

(5) Mutual Accountability
Donors and recipient should be mutually accountable for the development results. Implement mutual assessment framework and tools for evaluating the agreed commitments.

3) Accra Agenda for Action (2008)
The third High Level Forum on Aid Effectiveness (HLF 3) was held in Accra, Ghana in September 2-4, 2008 with the goal of assessing how far the world has come in the implementation of the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness and also to discuss new challenges (Global Donor Platform homepage 2009). The Accra meeting called for the need to renew the world’s commitment toward attaining the MDGs by 2015 and declared that aid is just one part of the larger picture to attain the MDGs (OECD 2008). Although progress has been observed since the 2005 Paris Declaration, the Accra Agenda for Action (AAA) called for further reform and faster action
in order to meet the goals of MDGs (Ibid.).

The AAA calls for action in the following three areas (OECD 2008):

- Strengthening Country Ownership over Development
- Building More Effective and Inclusive Partnerships for Development
- Delivering and Accounting for Development Results.

Noteworthy in the AAA are many references to broadening partnerships for development, which included not only partner countries (recipients of ODA), but also civil society organizations (CSOs). Although there were references to CSOs in previous OECD/DAC documents, it is the first time that they have been singled out as important partners in development cooperation. In the efforts to enhance partner country’s ownership, the AAA calls for greater policy-dialogue on development between developing countries and donors, greater coordination among donors in order to reduce redundancies and duplication among donor activities, untying aid in order to increase aid’s value for money, and for donors to agree to use the country system whenever possible (Ibid.). These measures also encourage the partner countries to continue to develop their institutions and resources so that their capacity will be enhanced to lead development efforts in their respective countries.

In addition, the AAA renewed its commitment toward working with fragile states. Countries in fragile situations refer to countries emerging from conflict, and concomitant weak ownership or capacity (Ibid.). The AAA urges donors to work with fragile states in realistic peace- and state-building objectives. Although fragile states are often in need of great external assistance, they have been shunned in some cases due to high levels of
insecurity and conflict situations, which could jeopardize the personnel and resources needed to be provided. Thus, many donors have been hesitant to provide assistance to these fragile states. The AAA urges the world to not ignore these fragile states in the context of development, poverty reduction and peace-building.

The fourth and the last High Level Forum on Aid Effectiveness (HLF 4) will take place 3 years after the HLF 3. It has been decided that the HLF 4 will take place in Seoul, South Korea in 2011. This meeting will be an important milestone to assess how far nations have come toward attaining the 2015 target of MDGs and a crucial follow-up to the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness.

III. Comparative Analysis of Aid Activities of Traditional vs. Emerging Donors

In light of the growing aid fatigue among the traditional donors and the global financial crisis, there has been increasing attention on aid from the South or emerging donors of ODA. In particular, aid from China and India has received a great deal of attention and in some cases, notoriety.

Although it is not easy to quantify the exact volume, allocation, and composition of aid of many emerging donors since their ODA activities are not reported in a comprehensive manner, ODA disbursements provided by some of the non-DAC donors can be used as a proxy. Net ODA disbursements of 15 non-DAC donors, who report their aid activities, increased from about $1 billion over the period 1995-2001 to $4.2 billion in 2005 (O’Keefe 2008). This constitutes approximately 5% of global ODA,
and it is estimated that this share will at least double by 2010 (O’Keefe 2008; Woods 2008).

The new donors’ participation in aid activities is welcomed to accelerate to MDGs’ achievement and expected to stimulate current global efforts for sustainable development. Based on shared experience of poverty reduction and successful growth, emerging donors can provide important opportunities for more horizontal interaction with partner countries and development community. They can also inspire new dialogue in multilateral development organizations representing the developing countries’ voices.

Despite the opportunities emerging donors bring, there are increasing concerns that emerging donors do not comply with donor activities agreed upon, and reflected in, the UN MDGs, OECD/DAC guidelines, and HLFs. There is great alarm voiced at large emerging donors, most notably China.

The Finance Ministers from the G8 countries provided an official statement at the 2006 conference on “Emerging Donors in the Global Development Community” that the new and re-emerging donors need to pursue more transparency in their aid policies and to encourage developing countries to meet higher standards of governance for development assistance (Russia G8 2006). A second concern is that emerging donors exacerbate the proliferation of aid channels and fragmentation of aid architecture, which is one of the most important issues in development cooperation. By offering ODA outside of existing international development norms and practices, there is a great danger that emerging donors may lack coordination with other donors and multilateral development organizations (Woods 2005). Another concern as Harmer and Cotterrell (2005) argue is that emerging donors prefer bilateral over multilateral ODA. There has been suspicion that South-South cooperation is used as a drive for “strategic articulated joint
position against the North” (Rosenbaum and Tyler 1975).

Although these concerns are voiced in journalistic accounts and by anecdotes, there is relatively little academic research on the topic. This paper aims to review some of the criticisms with empirical evidence collected from various sources including national statistics on aid activities from emerging donors and OECD/DAC statistics on aid activities of traditional donors.

In spite of relatively little empirical research on the topic of emerging donors, we were able to classify the concerns about aid activities of emerging donors as follows: (1) emerging donors put much less conditionality on ODA including environmental, social, labor, and human rights compared to traditional donors; (2) emerging donors are less concerned about global poverty reduction and humanitarian assistance, and more on national interests including energy and security; and (3) as a result of the above two, aid from emerging donors could lead to moral hazard among recipients (O’Keefe 2006; Manning 2006). In particular, China has been criticized for undermining global efforts for better governance by providing development aid to certain states, which have records of human rights abuses such as Sudan and Zimbabwe.

Before we examine the empirical evidence, we need to first define traditional and emerging donors. Traditional donor countries are considered to be advanced industrialized countries, which have provided development assistance since the end of World War II (Harmer and Cotterrell 2005; Rowlands 2008). They nearly overlap with OECD/DAC’s 23 members --i.e., 22 countries, which are Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Ireland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, UK, and the US, and the European Commission (Manning 2006).
Emerging donors are not as easy to define. There are several categories including non-OECD/DAC member countries that have contributed toward development cooperation activities. Many countries from the Middle-East, Asia, Latin America, Central Europe as well as South Africa and CMEA (Council for Mutual Economic Assistance including Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, the German Democratic Republic, Hungary, Poland, Romania and the USSR) have provided aid (Harmer and Cotterrell 2005; Manning 2006). Among these nations, China and India have received a great deal of attention due to their large volume and distinct aid activities. Although aid from several new donors declined in terms of volume and global share since the 1990s, they became visible once again when recent crises including those in North Korea, Iraq and Afghanistan required their active participation (Harmer and Cotterrell 2005).

Since many non-DAC countries have provided aid for a long time, or have recently re-emerged as donors, they sometimes find the term, “emerging donors” as not fitting their stature in aid activities and shunned the usage of the term. Thus, they are also called “non-DAC donors” or “re-emerging donors” (Manning 2006).

It is important to note that there is great variation among emerging donors, and may in fact represent greater diversity than traditional donors. There are about 30 new or emerging donors and they can be classified into four groups: (1) OECD non-DAC member countries; (2) new EU-member countries; (3) Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) and Middle-Eastern countries; (4) emerging economies including BRICs--Brazil, Russia, India and China (Manning 2006). See Table 2 for a list of countries in each group. The first two groups have recently expanded their participation in international development communities with increasing
ODA volume. South Korea, Poland, Turkey have announced their plan to join DAC by 2010 and have affirmed their commitment to accept responsibilities for international development and achievement of MDGs and conform to DAC guidelines. On the other hand, BRIC nations and many other emerging donors have not provided information on the actual volume and activities of aid to the international community. Thus, they could not be selected for our comparative analysis.

We will provide a comparative analysis of ODA activities of traditional vs. emerging donors based on empirical evidence. Rather than examining the proclaimed aid policies of these governments, we examined empirical evidence and data during the period 2003-07 on the following four issues: (1) bilateral vs. multi-lateral ODA; (2) ODA allocation by region/country; (3) ODA allocation by income group of recipients; and (4) ODA allocation by industrial sectors. These issues will help us address the criticisms that emerging donors provided aid in their narrowly defined national interests rather than for global and humanitarian goals.

The first issue deals with multilateral vs. bilateral aid. There is a concern among traditional donors that multilateral aid is more effective in terms of
delivering aid to recipients. However, emerging donors are sometimes accused of providing more in terms of bilateral aid, which tends to be more tied with national political and economic interests rather than with global poverty reduction. The second issue has to do with the concern that emerging donors tend to concentrate their aid to nations within the same region, which may not necessarily lead to reduction of extreme poverty. Given that many countries in sub-Saharan Africa suffer from extreme poverty and that most of the emerging donors are not in the region, aid from emerging donors do not contribute toward reducing the world’s extreme poverty.

The third issue has to do with the income levels of recipients. Similarly presented as the second issue, there is a concern that emerging donors look for countries that are already low-middle income economies with a good proven track record of development rather than countries with extreme poverty. Finally, there is concern that emerging donors tend to focus on infrastructure projects, which the traditional donors have now moved away for various reasons. These concerns have been expressed at various forums including official meetings of development stakeholders, journalistic accounts of aid activities, as well as academic international conferences. Without taking a predetermined view on these issues, this paper will examine with empirical evidence whether these concerns are supported, and whether emerging donors’ aid activities represent a qualitatively distinct paradigm shift.

Six traditional donor countries were selected – Australia, France, United States, Sweden, Japan, and Greece. Australia was selected since it represents one of the few countries outside of Europe and North America within the DAC, to provide us with greater variation among traditional donors. Sweden was selected since it is one of the Scandinavian countries with high levels
of ODA, which exceeds the OECD/DAC average of 0.7% of GNI. The 2008 figures show that Sweden’s ODA/GNI was 0.98%, which was one of the highest levels in the world. Sweden has been commended for exhibiting little sociopolitical and economic strategic interests in ODA implementation (Rowlands 2008). United States and Japan have actively participated in ODA as the largest donors in the world, albeit with some crucial deviations from the OECD/DAC guidelines. Japan was selected since it is the only Asian country in the OECD/DAC, which has also shown some distinct aid principles and activities. Greece was selected since it was one of newest members to have joined OECD/DAC (1991), and is still undergoing systemic and policy changes to improve its ODA system and effectiveness. Thus, these six traditional donors were selected to reflect the variation that exists among traditional donors.

Among the emerging donors, three countries - Poland, South Korea and Turkey - have been selected for this study. They are the three emerging donors that have proclaimed their wish to join OECD/DAC by 2010, and more importantly, they provide comprehensive and reliable ODA statistics. On the other hand, we recognize that ODA from China and India is very important to examine since their ODA’s volume and influence are not only great, but because much of the criticisms and concerns on emerging donors are directed toward these two countries. However, very little reliable data on aid from these two countries are available, and thus we are not able to include them in this study. Rather we will begin our comparative analysis of traditional vs. emerging donors with the three emerging donors as a start. We hope to expand our research to other emerging donors and in particular to BRICs when we are able to obtain empirical evidence.
1. Bilateral vs. Multilateral ODA

Multilateral ODA, which is channelled through multilateral development organizations and regional development banks, is considered by OECD/DAC that it can contribute toward improving aid effectiveness by lowering transaction costs, project duplication and administrative burden in the partner countries based on years of cumulative experience among members of DAC (Kanbur 2003). It also provides opportunities to discuss and achieve more coordinated aid policy and implementation based on skills and knowhow accumulated by multilateral organizations (Herfken 2000; Ram 2003). As a result, multilateral ODA can lead to more efficient use of development resources (Herfken 2000; Ram 2003). More importantly, multilateral ODA, which tends to be more independent from specific countries’ economic and political interests, can be used more readily for humanitarian purposes including MDGs and poverty reduction (Milner 2004). Thus, OECD/DAC has encouraged member countries to pursue more active and strategic multilateral development cooperation (OECD 2009). However, as Harmer and Cotterrell (2005) argue, new donors generally are relatively less active in multilateral aid.

We present our findings in Table 3, which provides comparisons of traditional and emerging donors in terms of bilateral vs. multilateral aid. The OECD/DAC average for multilateral aid was 21% in 2008. The findings show that most of the traditional donors had a higher level of multilateral aid than the DAC average, but the US was very low with only 11% and Australia with 24.6%. Other traditional donors provided somewhere between 29% and 50% in multilateral aid.

On the other hand, emerging donors with the exception of Poland showed
relatively little in multilateral aid. Although South Korea’s 26% was close to the DAC average, Turkey at 9.5% was significantly lower than the DAC average. Poland channels over 50% of its ODA through multilateral development cooperation organizations and regional development banks.

**Table 3** ODA Basic Statistics and Bilateral vs. Multilateral Aid (2008)

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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ODA (current USD million)</td>
<td>3,166</td>
<td>10,956.92</td>
<td>501</td>
<td>9,362.15</td>
<td>4,729.84</td>
<td>26,008.41</td>
<td>362.85</td>
<td>803</td>
<td>602.33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ODA/GNI (%)</td>
<td>0.32</td>
<td>0.28</td>
<td>0.16</td>
<td>0.18</td>
<td>0.98</td>
<td>0.18</td>
<td>0.09</td>
<td>0.18</td>
<td>0.19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Multilateral/Bilateral ODA (%)*</td>
<td>24.6</td>
<td>75.4</td>
<td>59.4 **</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>71</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>89</td>
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<tr>
<td>Multilateral ODA**</td>
<td>World Bank, ADB</td>
<td>EC, World Bank</td>
<td>EU, UN</td>
<td>UN, World Bank</td>
<td>UN, World Bank</td>
<td>World Bank</td>
<td>EU, World Bank</td>
<td>World Bank, UN</td>
<td>UN</td>
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Notes: * 2008 DAC average -- multilateral aid: 29%, bilateral aid: 71%.
** France has an average 27% in multilateral aid and 73% in bilateral aid (2006). 2008 shows a different pattern than most other years.
*** Multilateral partners are listed in the order of ODA volume.

Woods (2007) argues that emerging donors may fear that they may be put in a disadvantageous position vis-à-vis more influential traditional donors in the multilateral forum if they provide multilateral ODA. This can be a reason why some emerging donors are less active in multilateral aid. Emerging donors such as South Korea are also faced with the need to raise its domestic constituency’s public awareness for ODA. The aid agencies in South Korea fear that multilateral aid, which does not show the national flag symbolically, may not provide the necessary public relations (PR)
outcome. In an effort to raise public awareness in the domestic arena in which ODA may be seen as a luxury only traditional donors can afford, especially in light of the global financial crisis, many emerging donors may opt for bilateral aid.

We have witnessed recently that many new donors are increasingly participating in international development forums and initiatives (Brautigam 2008; Manning 2005). It should also be noted that not all emerging donors provide less than the DAC average, and that a few emerging donors actually exceed the DAC average. The traditional donors should be more proactive in providing guidance to emerging donors about how to raise public awareness in order to support greater aid activities in the world.

In sum, although emerging donors need to enhance their multilateral aid, their contribution was not very far behind that of traditional donors. In fact, it was noteworthy that not all the traditional donors have followed the OECD/DAC guidelines to increase multilateral assistance. More cooperation is needed in this area between traditional and emerging donors.

2. ODA Allocation by Country/Region

Many donors, whether they are traditional or emerging, consider foreign policy and security concerns in allocating development assistance. We have presented the findings in Table 4 regarding aid allocation by region and country. The findings show that Australia, Greece, Japan, Poland and South Korea concentrate their ODA in their neighboring regions, which are important for their foreign policy. They tend to promote economic growth and security in the region with which they have close historical, economic, socio-political, and cultural linkages. Their ODA can function as supporting
the neighboring countries’ economic development and democratization as well as their own commercial investments in the region.

<Table 4> ODA Allocation by Region/Country (2008)

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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Asia &amp; Pacific (Oceania)</td>
<td>76***</td>
<td></td>
<td>37.4</td>
<td>9</td>
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<tr>
<td>Far East Asia</td>
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<tr>
<td>South &amp; Central Asia</td>
<td>14.6</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>10.7</td>
<td>11.2</td>
<td>51</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Middle East</td>
<td>19</td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Middle East &amp; North Africa</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>12.4</td>
<td>38.7</td>
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<tr>
<td>Sub-Saharan Africa</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>18</td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>North &amp; Central America</td>
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<tr>
<td>Latin America and the Caribbean</td>
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<td></td>
<td>18</td>
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<tr>
<td>Europe</td>
<td>40.3</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>24</td>
<td></td>
<td>13.4</td>
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Note: * Classification system of regions was different in some countries. Thus, the categories are not mutually exclusive, and follow the distinction offered in the respective sources.

** Allocation order is based on the ODA volume.

*** Shaded numbers reflect ODA activities that are in the donor’s neighboring regions.


Australia, Greece, Poland, and South Korea focus on developing countries
in their regions, which include a number of fragile states or transition countries. However, the larger share of their ODA is devoted to low middle income countries rather than to LDCs. Although many of the emerging donors’ recipient nations are categorized as lower middle income countries, the fact that many emerging donors have not had much experience in aid activity outside of the region and do not have extensive pre-aid ties (such as colonial ties, etc.) result in higher level of aid activity in the neighboring regions.

It was interesting to note that the regional concentration of emerging donors’ aid activities is not very different from that of many traditional donors. See for example the US’ development assistance, which is heavily concentrated in Iraq and Afghanistan, due to the US security and foreign policy concerns on the “war against terrorism.”

France sets its priority partner countries in the name of “Priority Solidarity Zone” (ZSP) to focus its aid more effectively on 55 countries. Some of these countries are the old “ambit” countries - primarily former French African colonies and other countries in sub-Saharan Africa, the Middle East, Indochina, the Caribbean, and the Pacific (OECD 2004). Two-thirds of France’s ODA is destined to Africa, which is critical to attain the UN MDGs, but also important due to its strong historic ties with the continent.

On the other hand, it is quite commendable that Sweden provided the largest share of its ODA to sub-Saharan African nations, which are in jeopardy of falling behind in the attainment of UN MDGs. This is consistent with its contribution to the international development goals of poverty reduction and sustainable development.

In sum, regional concentration of aid activity is not new to emerging donors. As can be seen from the shaded cells in Table 4, which reflects the
largest share of ODA in the neighboring region, 3 out of 6 traditional donors and 2 out of 3 emerging donors have provided the greatest share of their aid to their neighboring regions. This pattern of aid activity should be understood in the context of historical ties with their neighboring region as well as the geographical/cultural distance from regions with extreme poverty. It is not surprising that emerging donors, which are located geographically far from regions with extreme poverty, have tended to shy away from those regions. It should be recommended to the emerging donors an alternative method of supporting countries in extreme poverty possibly through multilateral aid. Traditional donors should also be in compliance with OECD/DAC recommendations and provide greater aid to reduce extreme poverty in the world without being too critical of the emerging donors.

3. ODA Allocation by Income Group

OECD/DAC has recommended that donor countries put special policy consideration in allocating ODA funds for the least developed countries (LDCs) and other lower income countries, which have higher development needs in order to achieve MDGs and poverty reduction. Since the MDGs were announced, more development assistance has flowed towards LDCs. However, as many countries focus their ODA on neighboring countries or specific regions consistent with their foreign policy, the largest share of the ODA, whether it be from traditional or emerging donor countries, is highly concentrated on lower middle income countries rather than LDCs. Thus, the share of aid to the LDCs remains rather low.
As can be seen in Table 5, it is quite remarkable that almost all the countries in the study provided the largest share of their ODA to lower middle income countries. The only exceptions are Sweden and France: Sweden provides the greatest share of its ODA to LDCs; and France provides the largest share to other low income countries. Sweden is noted for greater autonomy in the decision-making process regarding ODA, which results in ODA activities relatively independent from national political and economic interests. Thus, Sweden’s ODA reflects a strong commitment toward reduction of extreme poverty in LDCs. The findings imply to us that there should be more concerted effort to provide greater assistance to LDCs from both traditional and emerging donors.

4. ODA Allocation by Sectors

ODA allocation in terms of sectors—infrastructure or other sectors—is often used as an indicator to see the level of “tiedness” in aid. OECD/DAC recommends that donors use as little tied aid as possible in order to ensure...
the most effective aid. OECD/DAC adopted measures for “Untying Official Development Assistance to the Least Developed Countries” in 2001. Many DAC members showed their commitments to increase untied aid, and in particular to sub-Saharan Africa. OECD/DAC publishes an annual report on the provision of untied ODA to the LDCs, which are presented at the annual DAC Development Ministerial Meeting (Kwon 2006).

However, several DAC members continue to provide aid in “tied aid,” in which aid is tied to the donor nation’s businesses for technology assistance and technical cooperation. Although these donor countries have argued that this was necessary to secure support from their domestic constituency, many members in the DAC argue that “untied” aid is more effective in attaining poverty reduction. Japan has been one of donors with the highest level of tied aid among DAC members, and Japan argues that this type of technical cooperation is the most effective means to transfer their technology and knowhow to developing countries.

Public opinion polls conducted by DAC members have shown that the public in DAC member countries actually agreed that poverty reduction of the recipient nation is more important than domestic corporate interests (OECD 2006c). This reveals that even those in the developed nations actually want real poverty eradication through effective aid (Ibid.). Furthermore, some studies have shown that tied aid not only increases administrative costs, but also provides technology that is not appropriate for the recipient countries, and in fact increases the cost by an average of 25% (Ibid.).

Since exact information on tied aid at the national level is difficult to access, we have provided the share of ODA in different sectors as a proxy to understand tied aid. In particular, we have provided empirical evidence for economic infrastructure and services, which can be used as a proxy for
tied aid, since tied aid is often provided in such economic infrastructure projects and programs.

<Table 6> ODA Allocation by Sector (2008)

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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Social infrastructure and services (%)</td>
<td>50 28 64 24 32 48</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>60 29.4</td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Economic infrastructure and services (%)</td>
<td>4 8 6 24 6 13</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>24 7.2</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Production (%)</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>-- 6</td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Debt relief (%)</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>22</td>
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<tr>
<td>Humanitarian aid (%)</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>10 12</td>
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Economic infrastructure and services includes physical facilities and services for transport, energy information, communication technology, irrigation, drinking water and sanitation. Aid in this sector has been declining since the 1970s and 1980s, except in 2004 reflecting the start-up in the reconstruction of Iraq (OECD 2006a). While the share of ODA of most donors to economic infrastructure and services remains at less than 10% (13% for United States due to post-war reconstruction in Iraq), Japan and South Korea spent approximately 24% of ODA in this sector. In particular, Japan has been long known for its focus on “economic infrastructure and service” sector in developing countries and South Korea has also been exhibiting a similar pattern. Their experience of successful economic growth
with development aid on economic infrastructure, and the comparative advantage their domestic stakeholders have in this sector have resulted in the two countries’ ODA focus on economic infrastructure (Kim 2006).

Economic infrastructure development contributes to economic growth by reducing production and transaction costs, increasing private investment, and raising agricultural and industrial productivity. In addition, economic infrastructure development can generate distributional effects on growth and poverty reduction through increased participation of the poor (OECD 2006b). Thus, OECD/DAC stresses the need to increase economic infrastructure in partner countries as well as sustainable service delivery and coordination among donors based on the needs of partner countries (OECD 2006b). However, OECD/DAC also recommends that these aid activities are provided in the form of untied aid rather than tied aid, which can help donor’s businesses rather than work for the interests of the partner’s developmental needs.

Table 6 presents data on social infrastructure and service sector. Aid in this sector includes government and civil society, water supply and sanitation, and programs on population, health, and education. The share of ODA to social infrastructure and services ranged from 24% to 64% among donor countries. Since the mid-1990s, aid to social infrastructure and services has been increasing to compensate for the adverse effects of structural adjustment policies with a renewed focus on social issues and poverty reduction such as Highly Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC), Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers (PRSP), and MDGs (OECD 2006a).

As we can see in Table 3, aid allocation patterns of emerging donors are not very different from that of traditional donors. The origins and characteristics of development assistance policy of all donors - traditional
and emerging - are remarkably similar. ODA allocation depends more on the geopolitical environment and historical economic circumstances in which donor countries are located in.

The issue of “tied aid” needs to be studied further with more detailed empirical evidence to shed light on the criticisms that emerging donors need to untie their aid.

IV. Conclusion

In the midst of a global financial crisis, we have witnessed that countries with extreme poverty may suffer the consequences in a much more severe way than other nations in the world. Thus, it is critical that we reexamine and reaffirm the UN MDGs not in spite of the financial crisis, but because of the financial crisis. The situation is dire and unless we take quick action, the world will suffer the consequences of extreme poverty world-wide such as the explosive growth of refugees, civil unrest, war for scarce resources, terrorism, or depletion of natural resources. This paper is an attempt to examine new emerging donors and to assess whether they are up to the task of participating in the global agenda for eradication of poverty.

There appears to a double-standard in the global aid community when it comes to emerging donors. On the one hand, they welcome new donors with welcome hands, so that more countries can become donors for development cooperation. As more countries share the burden of global poverty, the closer the world will come to the solution. However, there is also a growing concern that some aid activities of emerging donors are not in sync with shared norms and practices of aid as reflected in the UN MDGs.
and OECD/DAC guidelines. In particular, there is growing alarm that emerging donors' aid activities may in fact hurt the progress toward attaining UN MDGs by fostering a system of rent-seeking and moral hazard among partner countries and in some cases among donor countries' aid stakeholders.

Thus, this paper examined with empirical evidence, some key concerns regarding the emerging donors: (1) bilateral vs. multilateral aid; (2) ODA allocation by region/country; (3) ODA allocation by income group; and (4) ODA allocation by sector. The evidence, albeit limited, provides a glimpse at the comparison of traditional vs. emerging donors. The findings point to a revelation that emerging donors are not very different in terms of aid by income groups, and aid allocation in neighboring regions. The findings show that traditional donors are as varied as emerging donors and do not necessarily conform to OECD/DAC guidelines in terms of providing more aid for LDCs, and in regions with extreme poverty. It was interesting to note that some of the emerging donors presented a closer version to what OECD/DAC was recommending in terms of aid activities.

The picture on multilateral vs. bilateral aid was more mixed than had been argued in other studies. Although many of the traditional donors exceeded the DAC average of 29% in terms of multilateral aid, the US gave only 11% in multilateral aid. This was significantly lower than South Korea with 26% and Poland with 53%. Thus, we have found significant variations among not only the emerging donors, but also among traditional donors in terms of multilateral aid.

In terms of ODA allocation by income groups, we have confirmed the concern that emerging donors provided the greatest share of their aid to lower-middle income countries (42% for Turkey, 41.8% for South Korea, and 29.9% for Poland). However, this was a trend found among traditional
donors as well. With the exception of France and Sweden, the other 4 traditional donors provided more to low middle income countries relative to LDCs (54% for Australia, 49.6% for Greece, and 44.5% for Japan).

The regions and priority countries exhibited significant differences between traditional vs. emerging donors. The concern was that emerging donors unduly concentrate their aid in their neighboring regions often ignoring the LDCs in sub-Saharan Africa. It was evident in two out of three emerging donors that their aid activities were concentrated in their neighboring regions. However, it was interesting to note that Australia, Greece and Japan provided the largest share of their ODA in their neighboring regions as well.

The overall pattern we have found in our analysis is that aid activities among emerging donors is not significantly different from those of traditional donors. In fact we have found interesting variations among traditional donors, and some of which were not in compliance with the OECD/DAC guidelines. The results are mixed and not sufficient for us to draw the conclusion that there is a clear-cut qualitative difference between the traditional and emerging donors.

We were not able to include China and India in this study in spite of their large volume and impact on global aid activities due to limited data availability. Although this is a serious limitation of this study, it was important to start examining the growing criticisms and concerns about emerging donors and their aid activities before emerging donors decide to shy away from aid. It is premature to argue whether aid from China and India warrants the harsh criticisms against them. What we have argued in this paper is that it is important to use credible empirical evidence to derive at important conclusions about emerging donors. Surprisingly, not all the accusations on emerging donors were with merit, and it was noteworthy that
some of the traditional donors were not free from criticisms. Further research needs to be conducted in other emerging donors including China and India, where there seems to a growing concern about their aid activities that deviate from the global norm. We also need more in-depth analysis of emerging donors and their aid activities to have a better sense of truly how they may differ in terms of aid implementation.

Nonetheless, given what we have found in the three emerging donors, we need to be more cautious in drawing conclusions about the “alarming” pattern of emerging donors’ aid activities. Instead, we need to gather credible empirical evidence to examine whether such concerns can be substantiated. Efforts should be provided to better reflect the learning need of emerging donors as well as to cater more closely to the needs of partners. The emerging donors have not deviated greatly from OECD/DAC guidelines over and beyond what the traditional donors have done. We need to be more open in terms of embracing new emerging donors to the global standards, but also be open to learn from their valuable experiences of recent transformation from recipient to donor of aid.

We come to the conclusion that aid activities of emerging donors do not yet represent a paradigm shift in their aid activities, nor do they warrant the criticisms and notoriety that they deviate from global norms. There is certainly room for emerging donors to improve aid effectiveness and increase aid volume, but they should not be ostracized for being outliers of aid. Further research is needed to compare the traditional donors when they were themselves “new” donors vis-à-vis emerging donors of the 21st century to understand to what extent the emerging donors’ aid activities that appear to be different are merely a reflection of their stage of development assistance. In addition, empirical research needs to be done with a more comprehensive
set of data from all the emerging donors over the entire period of their aid activities in order to fully comprehend their “distinctiveness” and/or similarities to those of traditional donors.

What was clear from this analysis was that ALL donors including traditional and emerging donors need to work together to uphold the principles of UN MDGs and adhere to the best practices and guidelines provided by the OECD/DAC. The world is large and there is continuing need for greater assistance for nations in need.

Key words: Emerging donors, OECD/DAC, traditional donors, aid effectiveness, South-South cooperation

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<요약>
국제개발협력의 남-남 협력에 대한 비교 연구

김은미* · 이재은**

본 연구는 OECD/DAC의 비회원국들의 남-남 국제개발협력의 원조행위와 기존의 원조공여국들의 북-남 국제개발협력과의 비교연구이다. 신흥원조국들은 원조행위에 있어서 국제 규범을 무시하여 원조의 효과성을 오히려 저해한다는 지적을 국제사회로부터 받고 있다. 그러나 이러한 주장들은 실증적인 경험연구에 근거하지 않고 다만 한 두 경우의 왜곡된 사례에 근거한 경우들이 많았다.

본 연구는 OECD/DAC의 주요 통계와 각국의 국제개발협력관련 통계를 바탕으로 전통공여국 6개국과 신흥공여국 3개국을 비교 분석하였다. 신흥원조공여국의 원조행위에서 주요한 쟁점으로 부각된 다음의 4 주제에 대하여 분석하였다: (1) 다자 원조의 비율, (2) 공여국 주변지역에의 집중, (3) 수원국의 경제소득정도에 따른 원조, (4) 경제 기간 산업 등에 대한 집중도.

본 연구결과는 대부분의 연구 주제에서 신흥공여국들이 전통공여국들과 크게 다르지 않음을 보여주었고, 따라서 아직은 남-남 국제개발협력의 새로운 패러다임이라고 볼 수 없었다. 본 연구는 이와 더불어 전통공여국들도 세계적 규범에 맞지 않은 원조 행위를 하는 경우

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을 포함하여 원조형태가 다양함을 확인하였다.

주제어: 원조 효과성, 신홍원조공여국, 전통원조공여국, 남-남 개발 협력, OECD/DAC